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If the Karen National Union wants to continue playing a useful role in Burma, it
should stop trying to impose an artificial unity on Karen society
 
Karen identity means different things to different people. Since before Burmese 
independence in 1948, elites have sought to mobilize political support around 
competing ideas of “Karen-ness”. 
 
The best known nationalist projects have been those emerging in 
western-oriented, mostly Christian-led, S’ghaw dialect-speaking communities. For
many observers and supporters, the militarized nation-building project of the 
Karen National Union is the only authentic expression of Karen nationalism in 
Burma. Indeed, international agencies have played important roles in 
legitimizing the KNU’s version of Karen nationalism, especially through the 
provision of humanitarian relief to displaced people, via organizations linked 
to the KNU. 
 
However, the KNU is only one among a number of actors on the Karen political 
stage and represents only one strand of Karen nationalism. 
 
A less well-known version of Karen nationalism is associated with the “Union 
Karen” perspective, prevalent in Rangoon and the Irrawaddy Delta. This less 
aggressive but no less nationalist position has been adopted by elites who have 
sought an accommodation with the state of Burma, rather than challenging its 
foundations. However, since the imposition of military rule in 1962, and 
especially following the events of 1988-90, the Union Karen voice has been 
marginalized, in comparison with the uncompromising rhetoric produced by 
opposition groups along the Thai border. 
 
Union Karen networks operate under the patronage of a few mostly elderly 
leaders, many of whom are retired state officials, or politicians who returned 
to the legal fold in the 1950s and 1960s. These civil society networks are 
engaged in a number of community development projects inside Burma, many of them
associated with Christian churches. 
 
Since pre-colonial times, Karen society has produced other, sometimes competing,
expressions of nationalism, which have generally not been granted legitimacy by 
outsiders. 
 
Locally-centered sects, led by charismatic figures credited with occult powers, 
have long been active among Karen communities in Burma and Thailand. The most 
well known have been the Telecon and Likae cults, and “God’s Army”—which emerged
in the aftermath of the 1997 Burmese army offensive against the KNU in 
Tenasserim Division.
Page 1
'The Irrawaddy' October 2006
 
Outsiders have generally regarded these movements as historical or cultural 
oddities. But this is not the case with the Buddhist sangha. The Democratic 
Karen Buddhist Army is of particular interest, as it represents a Karen 
nationalist project in direct military and political competition with the KNU. 
The Buddhist-nationalist idea of Karen-ness is derived from many of the same 
historical roots as the KNU, with additional themes drawn from Buddhist 
tradition.
 
Although it often acts as a proxy for the regime, and members have committed 
serious human rights abuses, the DKBA has a clear ethno-nationalist agenda. 
There are a number of Karen language schools, and at least one cultural museum,
in DKBA-controlled areas. 
 
Traveling in Burma, I have met many Buddhist people who do not hesitate to 
identify themselves as Karen but do not recognize the KNU leadership. People 
from these communities tend to despise the military government and respect Aung 
San Suu Kyi. They would like to support a specifically Karen solution to their 
everyday problems of under-development and insecurity. Many are disappointed by 
the outcome of the DKBA adventure but have also been alienated by the KNU. They 
are available for political mobilization—but within what framework, and 
according to what idea of Karen-ness?
 
Since before independence, there have been various attempts to impose a unified 
identity upon this diverse society. Christian elites in particular have often 
presented themselves as the sole legitimate representatives of the Karen, 
suppressing alternative voices in the process. Such nation-building projects are
fundamentally undemocratic and divisive, resulting in the new conflicts, such as
the DKBA rebellion. 
 
I am very sympathetic to the deeply-held aspirations to self-determination of 
many members of the Karen and other ethnic communities in Burma. However, 
history has proved the quest for Karen unity to be elusive. 
 
In contrast to efforts to establish a single Karen identity and political 
leadership, a consociational approach could be considered—an approach that 
recognizes deep divisions but nonetheless maintains relative stability through 
dialogue. It would recognize Karen social and political diversity and accept the
segmented nature of this plural society as a starting point. 
 
Rather than trying to change Karen society, a consociational approach would aim 
to work with elites, building models of cooperation between different sectors of
the community. The diversity of Karen society may then become its strength, 
rather than a source of weakness. 
 
The main elements of consociational democracy are rule by coalition, the 
provision of minority vetoes, proportional representation in decision-making and
the allocation of funds and services, and federalism. The basic idea is that if 
cooperation and good will can be achieved between elites, then unity in 
diversity may be accepted and even celebrated. 
Page 2
'The Irrawaddy' October 2006
Copyright © 2006 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
Page 3
